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Profits and Politics: Coordinating Technology Adoption in Agriculture
Rohini Pande

Abstract
This paper examines the political economy of coordination in a simple two-sector model in
which individuals' choice of agricultural technology affects industrialization. We demonstrate
the existence of multiple equilibria; the economy is either characterized by the use of a
traditional agricultural technology and a low level of industrialization or the use of a mechanized
technology and a high level of industrialization. Relative to the traditional technology, the
mechanized technology increases output but leaves some population groups worse off. We show
that the distributional implications of choosing the mechanized technology restrict the possibility
of Pareto-improving coordination by an elected policy-maker, even when we allow for income
redistribution.
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Introduction

An increase in industrial activity, accompanied by a decline in agriculture’s share
in total output, has been a central element of the development experience of almost every high-income country.1 In many of these countries changes in agricultural
technology either preceded or accompanied industrialization (Chenery, Robinson and
Syrquin 1986). Historic examples include the widespread mechanization of agricultural production in England prior to the Industrial Revolution (Nurkse 1953), in the
US between 1860s and World War I (Oshima 1984; Kawagoe, Otsuka and Hayami
1984), and in Japan at the turn of the century (Ohkawa and Rosovsky 1973).2 More
recent examples include the East Asian economies in the post World War II period.
Between 1960 and 1990, relative to other Asian and African countries, these countries
experienced a sharp rise in the agricultural capital-labor ratio and a decline in the
use of labor in agriculture (see Figures 1 and 2).
This paper identifies how a coordination failure among investors in the agricultural sector can limit industrialization, and examines the constraints facing politicians
seeking to rectify this failure. We construct a simple two sector model populated by
landowners and workers. Relative to the traditional technology, the mechanized agricultural technology increases industrialization and returns to landowners but reduces
workers’ incomes. We show that multiple equilibria in the choice of technology can
cause the use of the traditional agricultural technology and low levels of industrialization to persist. Further, the distributional implications of the mechanized technology
may inhibit coordination by an elected policy-maker.
Specifically, we assume the policy-maker is elected from among the citizens and
1
2

Kuznet (1959) remains among the best known expositions of this phenomenon.
A common example of such mechanization was the widespread replacement of horse drawn

equipment by equipment powered by internal combustion.
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examine alternative policy regimes. In the first, the policy-maker directly chooses
the agricultural technology, while in the second, she provides price subsidies but
investment decisions remain decentralized. In either case she can redistribute income
via an anonymous tax and transfer policy. In the absence of policy-commitment, the
policy-maker’s returns from the choice of technology and redistribution policy depend
on her group identity. Hence, the policy-maker’s group identity affects the possibility
of coordination. If the policy-maker can directly invest in the agricultural technology
then she chooses the mechanized technology and the population group to which she
does not belong is made worse off. If investment decisions remain decentralized then
the outcome varies with the policy-maker’s group identity. If the policy-maker is a
landowner, then the mechanized technology is chosen and workers are worse off. If the
policy-maker is a worker, then landowners, anticipating high levels of redistribution,
stick with the traditional technology. This last case constitutes a political failure
since with the same set of policy instruments a Pareto superior equilibrium could be
realized if the policy-maker could commit to a redistribution policy.3
In this model, a key feature of the mechanized technology is it’s use of industrial
inputs. The fact that newer, more efficient, agricultural technologies are also more
likely to use industrial inputs is well documented, a well-known example being the
adoption of high yielding crop varieties (Evenson and Westphal (1995)). However,
the implications of such inter-sector linkages for industrialization remain controversial. Some, like Lewis (1955), and Hirschman (1958), argue that the mechanization
of agricultural production helps transfer resources, especially labor, to the industrial
sector. Others argue that changes in agricultural methods of production affect industrialization by increasing the (agricultural) demand for industrial goods (see, for
3

Dixit and Londegran (1995) and Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) examine how the distributional

consequences of investments can prevent their adoption. They differ from our paper in their focus
on economic environments characterized by an unique equilibrium.
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instance, Johnston and Mellor (1961) and Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989a)). In
our model we allow for both supply-side and demand-side linkages between the two
sectors.4
The use of the mechanized technology shifts labor from a constant returns to scale
sector (agriculture) to an increasing returns to scale sector (industry). This increases
the number of industrial varieties produced and reduces the price per variety. This,
in turn, reduces the price of adopting the mechanized technology and lowers consumer prices. Both forces work to make the combination of mechanized agriculture
and industrialization self-sustaining. However, as prices are invariant to any single
citizen’s investment decision the choice of the traditional agricultural technology and
low levels of industrialization also remains an equilibrium. This multiplicity of equilibria derives from the pecuniary externalities associated with use of the mechanized
technology. The classic study documenting that technology adoption in agriculture is
closely linked to profitability and market size remains the study by Griliches (1957)
on the spread of hybrid seed corn in U.S. agriculture (see Besley and Case (1993) for
a review of this literature).
The idea that a coordination failure among investors in the agricultural sector
can cause agricultural stagnation and industrial backwardness to persist is echoed
in the literature on ‘big push’ models of industrialization (see, for example, Murphy,
Shleifer and Vishny (1989b)).5 In these papers a coordination failure among investors
can prevent the economy from obtaining the Pareto superior high industrialization
equilibrium. Hence, the conclusion that governments should coordinate investment
activity.6 Our innovation is to demonstrate that this conclusion is sensitive to the
4

The relative importance of supply-side and demand-side linkages between agriculture and in-

dustry was also the basis of the famous Corn law debate between Malthus and Ricardo.
5
The idea that a coordination failure amongst investors may cause low levels of industrialization
to persist was first discussed by Rosenstein Rodan (1943).
6
The East Asian growth miracle is often, in part, attributed to the government’s coordination
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assumption that citizens have identical factor endowments. In our model, adoption of
the mechanized technology benefits landowners but leaves workers worse off. These
distributional implications of technological change affect both the possibility and the
welfare implications of policy-led coordination.7
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 uses a two sector model in
which landowners face a choice of agricultural technology to examine how landowners’
investment decisions affect industrialization. Section 3 examines the political economy
of coordination, and Section 4 concludes with a discussion of possible extensions.
Proofs are in the Appendix.

2

Agricultural Technology Adoption and Industrialization

In this section we show how, in the presence of inter-sector production linkages,
landowners’ agricultural technology choice affects the extent of industrialization, as
measured by the number of industrial varieties produced.

2.1

Economic Environment

The economy consists of N citizens, indexed by j ∈ N = {1, ..., N }, and lasts a single
period. Total labor and land endowments are L > 1 units of labor and one unit of
land. Citizen j 0 s labor endowment is denoted as αj L, and her land endowment as βj
policy, e.g. Wade (1990).
7
Sah and Stiglitz (1984, 1987) examine how policy led changes in the agriculture-industry terms
of trade affect industrialization, and note that industrial policies may make some citizens’ worse off.
They, however, do not examine how these adverse distributional consequences affect the feasibility
of industrialization.
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where αj , βj ∈ [0, 1]. All landowners have identical land endowments, and there is no
market for land. Labor is fully mobile across sectors.
A citizen supplies her labor and land endowment for production, and earns income
yj ≡ αj wL+βj π, where π is the return on land and w is the wage. She uses her income
to buy food and manufactures, denoted as F and M respectively. Her preferences
take the form: uj = F ν M 1−ν , where ν ∈ ]0, 1[, and ν 6= 21 .
Landowners produce food using either a basic or mechanized technology, indexed
by τ ∈ {b, m}. These technologies are defined as:
Fb = min (l ,h)
Ã

l
M
Fm = min
, h,
γ
κ

!

l denotes the labor requirement and h the land requirement. The parameters γ ∈ ]0, 1[
and κ ∈ ]0, 1] characterize the efficiency of the production function. I assume that
M > κ and that land supply limits food production. Hence, independent of the
agricultural technology in use one unit of food is produced.8 Use of the mechanized
technology is, however, associated with an additional demand for κ units of manufactures and a reduced labor demand of γ < 1 units. We normalize the price of food
and denote the price of manufactures by P . Returns to land vary with agricultural
technology: πb = 1 − wb and πm = 1 − γwm − κP . We assume the labor endowment is
sufficiently large so that L >

1
.
2ν−1

This implies that πb > wb L > 0.9 We also assume

that no single individual’s actions can influence factor prices.
Manufactures are produced in the industrial sector which is characterized by monopolistic competition. A continuum of firms, indexed by i, produce different varieties
of manufactures. Firm i produces quantity xi of variety i and prices it at pi . These
8

ν > 0 rules out the corner solution of zero food production.

9

The condition πb > wb L simplifies to L >

1
2ν−1 .

which is positive for L > 1.

6

The condition wb L > 0 simplifies to

(1−ν)
ν(L−1) L

>0

varieties are aggregated into a single manufactures good via a production function
which exhibits constant elasticity of substitution in the quantities of each product
type (Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Ethier (1982)). That is,




Z

M ≡

ε−1
ε

xi

ε
ε−1

di

i∈n

and




Z

1
1−ε

p1−ε
di
i

P ≡
i∈n

n is the set of varieties produced in equilibrium and ε is the elasticity of substitution
across varieties. I assume ε > 1 such that product varieties are imperfect substitutes.
ρ≡

ε−1
ε

measures citizens’ intensity of preference for variety. Given a sufficiently large

number of industrial varieties, the elasticity of inverse demand faced by a producer can
be approximated as 1 − ρ (Dixit and Stiglitz 1977). Costless product differentiation
by firms implies that each firm produces a different variety.
The production functions for all industrial varieties are identical.10 Production
of variety i involves a fixed cost of δ labor units and a marginal cost of φ units of
output. Firm i ’s production function is:
xi =

li −δ
φ

for li > δ; 0 otherwise

with associated profits: pi xi − w(φxi + δ).
Monopolistic competition implies that, in equilibrium, variety i0 s price equates marginal
revenue (ρpi ) and marginal cost. Hence pi ( ε−1
) = φw. For notational simplicity asε
sume φ =

ε−1
.
ε

Thus variety i0 s price equals the wage, or
pi = w

10

The industry wide demand for labor is l d =

npx
w .
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(1)

Monopolistic competition also implies that, in equilibrium, pi xi = w(φxi + δ). Hence,
output per firm is constant at
xi =

δ
1−φ

(2)

Firms produce the same output per variety, x, and price each variety identically at
ε

price p.11 The manufactures production function simplifies to M = n ε−1 x (with
1

P = n 1−ε p).
To solve for equilibrium we first characterize the production and consumption
decisions associated with each agricultural technology and then identify landowners’
technology choice. As landowners are identical we restrict attention to the case where
all landowners choose the same technology.

2.2

Choice of Technology

Agricultural labor demand, and therefore the wage, varies with the choice of technology. Equating labor demand and supply under each technology gives us
wb =

xnb pb
L−1

and

wm =

xnm pm
L−γ

(3)

Combining equation (3) with the price wage identity (equation (1)) gives us our first
result.
Proposition 1: Use of the mechanized agricultural technology increases industrialization.
Use of the mechanized agricultural technology reduces agricultural labor demand
by (1 − γ) units. The main issue is whether the increase in industrial labor supply
only alters factor prices or also increases the number of industrial varieties produced.
Proposition 1 tells us that the latter holds. This reason is that since industrial varieties
11

The symmetric way in which industrial varieties enter the formulation of M and convexity

(0 < ρ < 1) implies that citizens consume identical amounts of each variety.
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are imperfect substitutes (ρ < 1), consumers exhibit a love for variety. Hence, the
production of industrial varieties exhibit positive returns to the division of labor. As a
result labor availability, not demand, limits industrialization. By shifting labor away
from a constant returns to scale sector (agriculture) to an increasing returns to scale
sector (industry) the mechanized agricultural technology increases output .
The final demand for variety x in the economy is
Ã

x=

Pτ
pτ

!ε

Eτ
Pτ

(4)

Eτ is the total expenditure on manufactures, consisting of consumer and agricultural
sector expenditure. Consumer expenditure is given by

N
P

(1−ν)yj .12 Use of the mech-

j=1

anized agricultural technology generates an additional agricultural sector demand of
κPa units. Hence,
Eb = (1 − ν)((L − 1)wb + 1)

(5)

Em = (1 − ν)((L − γ)wm + 1) + κνPm
Combining equations (4) and (5) gives the price of industrial varieties associated with
the use of each technology.
pb =

1−ν
νnb x

and

pm =

1−ν
ε
1−ε

νnm (x − nm κ)

(6)

Due to imperfect substitutability between industrial varieties the efficiency of manufactures production is increasing in the number of varieties produced.13 Therefore,
for a fixed Eτ , P falls as n rises. This affects p in three ways. For any single firm
i a fall in P reduces the profits associated with producing variety i. This negative
12

Identical homothetic preferences imply that total consumer demand is the aggregation of indi-

vidual demand functions.
13
Imperfect substitutability between varieties implies that the lower is n the more intensively
consumers substitute for missing inputs in their consumption of the manufactures aggregate.
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product market effect lowers p. On the other hand, the fall in P creates two positive
pecuniary externalities. First, it reduces the cost of using the mechanized agricultural technology and makes its adoption more likely. Conditional on its adoption,
manufactures demand increases. This cost (or forward) linkage between firms and
the agricultural sector enhances firm profits and raises p. For similar reasons, a fall
in P also generates a demand (or backward) linkage by raising consumer expenditure
on manufactures.
The strength of the inter-sector linkages, and the extent of labor saving associated
with the mechanized agricultural technology, determine the relative strengths of the
negative product market effect and positive pecuniary externalities. These, in turn,
determine the price of industrial varieties, p, and landowners’ technology choice.
Proposition 2: Landowners’ technology choice varies with the strength of intersector linkages, κ, and the extent of labor saving, γ, associated with the mechanized
agricultural technology
(i) Landowners choose the mechanized technology if
nology if

κ
(1−γ)

1

κ
(1−γ)

1

< nbε−1 and the basic tech-

ε−1
> nm

(ii) Multiple investment equilibria exist such that landowners either choose the basic
or the mechanized technology whenever
1
(ε−1)
nm
≥

1
κ
≥ nb(ε−1)
(1 − γ)

For low values of κ and γ the mechanized agricultural technology minimizes landowners factor costs. This leads to an unique investment equilibrium in which all landowners choose the mechanized agricultural technology. However, as

∂pm
∂κ

> 0, the mech-

anized technology becomes more expensive as κ rises. For a sufficiently high κ the
positive pecuniary externalities associated with use of the mechanized technology
cannot compensate for the higher factor prices. An unique investment equilibrium in
which landowners choose the basic agricultural technology results.
10

For intermediate values of κ and γ increasing returns in the manufacturing sector,
combined with the possibility of pecuniary externalities, creates multiple investment
equilibria. If landowners choose the basic technology few industrial varieties are
produced at a relatively high cost. Given this price structure, a landowner’s best
response is to choose the basic technology. The result is an equilibrium in which
landowners choose the basic technology. If, instead, landowners choose the mechanized technology more industrial varieties are produced and the cost of adopting the
mechanized technology is reduced. In addition, consumer demand for manufactures
rises. This makes the combination of landowners choosing the mechanized technology
and a higher level of industrialization sustainable.
Food production is the same under the two technologies, but industrial output is
higher with the mechanized technology in use. Social surplus (SS) is given by the
sum of citizens’ indirect utilities, such that
"

ε

1 νnb ε−1 x
SSb =
ν 1−ν

#1−ν

"

ε

1 ν(nm ε−1 x − κ)
; SSm =
ν
1−ν

and

#1−ν

(7)

Lemma 1: The mechanized agricultural technology maximizes social surplus in the
multiple equilibria regime.
Consumers’ love of variety implies that social surplus is increasing in the number of
industrial varieties produced. On the other hand, social surplus is decreasing in the
strength of inter-sector linkages (as captured by κ) since

∂pm
∂κ

> 0. The mechanized

technology maximizes social surplus only if the efficiency gains (in terms of the number
of industrial varieties produced) outweighs the potential price increase associated with
its use. Lemma 1 tells us that this is true in the multiple equilibria regime.

11

3

The Political Process and Coordination

The role for the government as a coordinator of economic activity has been widely
discussed in the literature on coordination failures in industrial investment.14 Murphy,
Shleifer and Vishny (1989b), for instance, write in the context of big push models of
industrialization, ‘The analysis may have implications for the role of government
in the development process. First, a program that encourages industrialization in
many sectors simultaneously can substantially boost income and welfare even when
investment in any one sector appears unprofitable.’
Most existing multiple equilibria models of industrialization are representative
agent models. In these, it is immediate that all individuals are better off in the outputmaximizing high industrialization equilibrium. The possibility of welfare-improving
coordination in these models, therefore, turns on whether policies which make the
high investment equilibrium the unique outcome for the economy exist (on this, see
Bond and Pande (2005)). However, with heterogeneity in factor endowments some
individuals may be worse off in the high investment equilibrium. In such a setting
examining how the political economy of coordination can affect a governments’ ability
to implement a Pareto superior outcome for the economy becomes relevant.
1
(1−ε)
≥
We focus on the case where multiple investment equilibria exist, that is nm

κ
(1−γ)

1

≥ nb(1−ε) , and every citizen is either a landowner or a wage laborer. To focus on

the aggregate investment effects of government led coordination we consider a large
14

An early argument in favor of government coordination was offered by Scitovsky (1954),‘ Market

prices, however, reflect the economic situation as it is and not as it will be. For this reason they
are more useful for coordinating current production decisions .. than .. for coordinating investment
decisions which have delayed effects .. hence the belief that there is need either for centralized
investment planning or some additional communication system to supplement the pricing system as
a signalling device.’
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population (N → ∞), and fixed landowner and worker population shares.15 Every
landowner ` (∈ K = {1, ..k}) owns

1
k

units of land and earns an income y` =

every worker ω (∈ W = {k + 1, ...N }) supplies
yω =

wτ L
.
N −k

L
N −k

πτ
,
k

while

labor units and earns an income

Finally, we assume that k satisfies the inequality

πb
k

>

wb L
.
N −k

We consider a citizen candidate model of politics in which citizens choose whether
to stand for election (Osborne and Slivinski (1996); Besley and Coate (1997)). The
time line of events is – Citizens decide whether to enter as candidates. Then, citizens
elect a policy-maker from the pool of citizen candidates. The policy-maker announces
the parameters of the coordination policy. Finally, landowners invest in an agricultural technology, and payoffs are realized. A key assumption is that candidates cannot
commit to policies prior to election. This implies that the policy-maker will always
select the policy which maximizes her private return. Anticipating this, citizens will
condition their vote on candidates’ policy preferences.16 The inability of politicians
to commit to policies has been documented in a wide variety of contexts – see, for
instance, Butler, Lee and Moretti (2004) and Pande (2003).
We restrict attention to one candidate equilibria in which a member of the majority
group stands for election and wins. Such an equilibrium exists as long as one group of
citizens constitute a strict population majority and the cost of standing for election is
not too high (for details, see Besley and Coate (1997)). We assume these conditions
are satisfied.
The absence of policy commitment implies that the elected policy-maker will seek
15

Hence, factor prices are invariant to a single investor’s actions and changes in her pre-tax income

(holding other citizens income constant) does not affect her income transfer. αj = 0 and βj =

1
k

for

landowners; and αj = N 1−k and βj = 0. for workers
16
We, therefore, restrict attention to time-consistent policies, that is policies which the policymaker will not have an incentive to change after the technology choice is realized.
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to implement the agricultural technology τ ∗ which maximizes her utility, such that:
µ

µ

¶

µ

wτ L
πτ
τ = arg max X
+ (1 − X)
N −k
k
∗

¶¶

Pτ−(1−ν)

(8)

where X equals 0 if the policy-maker is a landowner and 1 otherwise.17
A policy intervention is feasible only if it is budget balancing in equilibrium. We
do not require budget balancing off the equilibrium path. This assumption is similar
to the restrictions assumed in the Ramsey capital accumulation model. We also
assume that policy interventions are strongly anonymous, i.e. a citizen’s final payoff
only depends on her strategy.
We examine coordination under two different policy regimes. First, the case where
the policy-maker directly chooses the agricultural technology. Historic examples include the Soviet collectivization of agriculture in the 1930s, and the setting up of
Chinese state farms in the 1960s. Second, we consider the case where the government
announces price subsidies but investment decisions are chosen by landowners. We
require that the choice of price subsidies satisfies the budget constraint in equilibrium.18 Throughout we assume the policy-maker can redistribute final incomes via
an anonymous tax and transfer schedule, denoted as (t, T ) with the associated budget constraint t

P
j

yj = N T. We also assume that, absent coordination, landowners

choose the basic technology. Hence, our welfare comparisons contrast the outcomes
associated with state-led coordination with an equilibrium in which all landowners’
choose the basic technology.
17

The policy-maker’s group identity depends on whether workers or landowners constitute a strict

majority.
18
A different way of distinguishing between these policies is that the first, where the policy-maker
chooses the technology, ignores the budget constraint while in the second the policy must be budget
balancing in equilibrium.
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3.1

Socialization of Investment

We define investment in the economy as socialized whenever the elected policy-maker
directly invests in the agricultural technology. The sequence of events is – a single
candidate from the majority group stands for election and is elected. She then invests
in the agricultural technology and announces the redistribution policy.19
Proposition 3: With socialized investment the mechanized technology is chosen. If
a landowner is policy-maker then no redistribution occurs and workers are worse off.
If a worker is policy-maker then full redistribution occurs and landowners are worse
off.
The mechanized technology maximizes social surplus (Lemma 1). However, the
use of the mechanized technology reduces the relative price of manufactures and raises
landowners’ profit. Hence, the mechanized technology maximizes landowners’ indirect
utility. In contrast, the price wage equality (equation 1) implies workers are made
worse off.
A landowner’s income exceeds that of a worker. Therefore, if elected policy-maker,
she will invest in the mechanized technology and choose zero redistribution.20 Proposition 3 tells us that this leaves workers’ worse off than when the basic technology was
in use. A worker, if elected policy-maker, implements the mechanized technology and
full redistribution. Proposition 3 also tells us that, whenever landowners’ are a population minority, a landowner’s agricultural profits from the basic technology exceed
19

The political equilibrium can be justified as follows: by assumption, the policy-maker cannot

commit to an agricultural technology during the election campaign. Therefore, citizens’ anticipate
candidates’ policy preferences and vote for the candidate who shares their preferences. For sufficiently low entry costs this implies an equilibrium in which a candidate from the majority group
stands for election and win. Anticipating this outcome no other candidate will stand for election.
wb L
20
bL
mL
By assumption πkb > Nw−k
. From proposition 3 we know that πkm > πkb and w
N −k < N −k . Hence
πm
k

>

wm L
N −k .
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the per capita income associated with the use of the mechanized technology. Hence
landowners’ are worse off whenever the policy-maker is a worker. Which of these two
outcomes occurs depends on which group constitutes the population majority.

3.2

Decentralized Investment and Coordination

We now consider the case where investment decisions remain decentralized, i.e. are
privately chosen by landowners. The policy-maker seeks to affect technology choice by
the use of price subsidies, potentially combined with income redistribution. Examples
of such a policy include the provision of subsidized inputs by agricultural extension
services in many developing countries (Evenson and Westphal 1995).
We start by noting that the multiplicity of equilibria is invariant to income redistribution.
Lemma 2:The multiplicity of equilibria is robust to the use of a budget balancing
linear tax and transfer scheme.
The proof is as follows – with a linear tax and transfer scheme a citizen’s final income
remains
a function
of her pre-tax income and total income. That is, yjc = (1 − t)yj +
Ã
!
P
1
yj . Start with an equilibrium in which all landowners choose the basic
t
N
j∈N

technology. If a single landowner deviates to the mechanized technology then both
her pre-tax income (yj ) and total income are reduced (see the proof of proposition
2). Since an investor’s post tax income is a linear combination of these two it also
falls. Hence, investing in the mechanized technology cannot constitute a profitable
deviation for any single investor.21
Multiple investment equilibria arise when an investor’s optimal strategy depends
on other investors’ strategy (Cooper and John 1988). To affect coordination a policy
21

This reasoning is similar to the argument provided by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989b) for

why profit spill-overs are insufficient to engender multiple equilibria.
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must make investing in the mechanized technology a dominant strategy for an investor
(for a more general discussion of the issues, see Bond and Pande (2005)). Lemma 2
states that a linear income-based intervention fails to do so.
We now consider the joint use of price subsidies and a linear tax and transfer
scheme by the policy-maker. We assume that price subsidies are not conditioned on
any single investor’s investment choice.
Proposition 4 A landowner, if elected policy-maker, announces zero redistribution
and price subsidies such that final prices are pm , Pm . Landowners respond by choosing
the mechanized technology and workers are made worse off. If a worker is, instead,
elected policy-maker then, independent of her choice of price subsidies, multiple investment equilibria persist.
A landowner, if elected policy-maker, announces the prices associated with use
of the mechanized technology, and zero redistribution. It follows from proposition
2 that a landowner’s best response is to invest in the mechanized technology. This
policy is budget balancing in equilibrium and maximizes landowners’ income. This
choice of redistribution, however, leaves workers worse off (see proof of proposition 3
for details).
In contrast, if a worker is elected policy-maker then, conditional on landowners
choosing the mechanized technology, she will always implement full redistribution
such that each individual earns (the same) fraction of total output. This renders
a landowner’s final income independent of her actions and implies that investing
in either the basic or the mechanized technology constitutes a (weakly) dominant
strategy for a landowner. Hence, the existence of multiple investment equilibria is
robust to any price subsidies proposed by the policy-maker. This outcome reflects
how the absence of policy commitment can lead to a political failure – with the same
set of policy instruments, a policy-maker who could commit to less than complete
redistribution, could have delivered a Pareto superior outcome for the economy.
17

4

Discussion

In this paper we identify how a coordination failure among investors in the agricultural
sector can limit industrialization in this sector, and in linked sectors. We also find that
the mechanization of agriculture creates both winners and losers. The distributional
consequences of technological change affect the policies chosen by an elected policymaker. In the absence of policy commitment, government led coordination is likely
to be ineffective or leave some citizens worse off.
We assume all workers are equally suited to working in either the agricultural or
industrial sectors. Papers such as Caselli (1999) suggest that, in reality, labor may
be heterogenous with skilled and unskilled labor benefitting differentially from the
introduction of new technologies. A natural way of allowing for labor heterogeneity
would be to assume that only a subset of workers can work in the industrial sector and
that labor in the industrial sector earns a wage premium. This would imply another
source of pecuniary externalities in the economy and the economy would continue to
exhibit multiple investment equilibria.22 Finally, our findings on the political economy
of coordination would continue to hold as technological change continues to leave some
citizens, here unskilled labor, worse off.
The choice of the mechanized technology (partially) substitutes industrial input
for labor. It, however, does not allow for substitution away from land towards manufactures. A natural justification is that land is essential for growing food. However, it
could be that a mechanized technology allows the same amount of food to be produced
on less land, say via multi-cropping. To account for this our agricultural production
function could be generalized to allow the industrial input and land to be substitutes.
This will potentially reduce the gains for landowners associated with adoption of the
22

This wage mechanism is similar to the source of pecuniary externalities that underlies the mul-

tiplicity of equilibria in Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989b)
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mechanized technology. However, as long as the wage reduction associated with the
adoption of the mechanized technology was sufficient the landowners’ would continue
to earn higher profits with manufactures, and our findings in this paper would hold.
The political economy of coordination has received limited attention in the literature, in part because most models of coordination failure consider an economy
populated by individuals with identical endowments. Our findings demonstrate that
once we move to a setting with heterogenous agents, the political economy of coordination is central to understanding the choice of policies. Perhaps most striking
is our finding with decentralized investment decisions a policy-maker belonging to
the group whose factor returns are adversely affected by technological change cannot
affect coordination. Moreover, the reason for this is her inability to commit to not
redistribute income in favor of her group.
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Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1
From equation (1) pτ = wτ . This, combined with the wage equation (equation (3)),
gives:
nb =

L−1
x

and

nm =

L−γ
x

(9)

γ < 1 ⇒ nm > nb . Hence, the number of industrial varieties produced is strictly
higher with the mechanized technology.
Proof of Proposition 2
By assumption πb > 0. Consider an equilibrium in which all landowners choose
the basic technology. In equilibrium all landowners make a positive profit. This
equilibrium is Nash if, conditional on all other landowners’ choosing the mechanized
technology, it is not profitable for any single landowner to choose the mechanized
technology. This is true iff βj πb ≥ βj πm or
1 − wb ≥ 1 − γwb − κPb
Substituting for wb and Pb , an equilibrium in which all landowners choose the basic
technology exists if
1
κ
≥ nb (ε−1)
(1 − γ)

(10)

Now consider an equilibrium in which landowners choose the mechanized technology.
Landowner j will not deviate to investing in the basic technology iff βj πm ≥ βj πm or
(1 − γwm − κPm ) ≥ (1 − wm )
which simplifies to
1
κ
≤ nm (ε−1)
(1 − γ)

23

(11)

Comparing (10) and (11) and noting that nm > nb implies that the economy is
characterized by multiple investment equilibria if
1

nb(ε−1) ≤

1
κ
(ε−1)
≤ nm
(1 − γ)

(12)

Further, equations (10), (11) and (12) imply a unique equilibrium in which landowners
invest in the basic technology if
1
κ
(ε−1)
> nm
(1 − γ)

and a unique equilibrium in which landowners invest in the mechanized technology if
1
κ
< nb(ε−1)
(1 − γ)

Proof of Lemma 1
The mechanized technology maximizes social surplus if Pb > Pm or
ε

ε

ε−1
− nbε−1 )
κ < x(nm

(13)

Combining (12) and (13) it follows that the mechanized technology maximizes social
surplus in the M.E. regime if
ε

1

ε

(ε−1)
ε−1
x(nm
− nbε−1 ) > (1 − γ)nm

Rearranging this expression gives:
ε

ε

ε−1
nm
− nbε−1
1
ε−1

>

nm
Note that

1−γ
x

=

(L−γ)−(L−1)
x

1−γ
x

(14)

= nm − nb . Substituting in (14) and solving gives
1

1

ε−1
nm
> nbε−1

(15)

Equation (15) always holds. Hence, the mechanized technology maximizes social
surplus in the multiple equilibria regime.
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Proof of Proposition 3
In the multiple equilibria regime pm < pb . To see this note Pm < Pb (from Lemma 1).
1

Further from proposition 1 we know that nm > nb . It follows that, since Pτ = nτ1−ε pτ
a necessary condition for Pm < Pb is pm < pb .
We first show that the mechanized technology raises landowners’ indirect utility, but
reduces workers. That is:
Lwm −(1−ν)
wb L −(1−ν)
Pm
<
P
N −k
N −k b

and

πm −(1−ν) πb −(1−ν)
P
> Pb
k m
k

(16)

Equation (16) simplifies to
−(1−ν)

wm Pm−(1−ν) < wb Pb

Therefore, a necessary condition for wm Pm−(1−ν) <

Pb > Pm ( from Lemma 1).
−(1−ν)

wb Pb

−(1−ν)

; πm Pm−(1−ν) < πb Pb

and

is that wm < wb . Importantly this is also sufficient. To see this first
−(1−ν)

note that wτ = pτ .wm Pm−(1−ν) < wb Pb

⇒

(1−ν)

Pm
pm

>

(1−ν)

Pb

pb

⇒

(1−ν)(ε−1) ν
pm

n(1−ν)(ε−1)
pvb > nb
m

(17)

Since nm > nb and pb > pm this inequality (17) always holds. Further a sufficient
−(1−ν)

condition for πm Pm−(1−ν) > πb Pb

is that πm > πb . Therefore if wm < wb ⇒ πm >

πb then equation (16) always holds.
1

1−ε
)wm < wb .
πb < πm holds if (γwm + κPm ) < wb . This simplifies to (γ + κnm

Therefore
wm < wb
·

1

and

; πm > πb

¸

(18)

1

1−ε
1−ε
if max wm , (γ + κnm
)wm < wb . Clearly if (γ + κnm
) < 1, then the sufficient

condition for (18) is wm < wb .
1

1

1−ε
ε−1
(γ + κnm
) < 1 ⇒ κ < (1 − γ)nm
. This condition always holds in the multiple

equilibrium regime. Hence, wm < wb ⇒ πm > πb .
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By assumption

πb
k

>

wb L
.
N −k

per capita income i.e.
wm L
N −k

<

wb L
.
N −k

Hence

πm
k

wb L
N −k

>

It follows that a worker’s income must be less than the
1
.
Nν

<

From proposition 3 we also know that

πm
k

>

πb
k

and

wm L
.
N −k

It follows that a landowner, if elected, will select the mechanized technology and
no redistribution. A worker maximizes her indirect utility by selecting the mechanized
technology and undertaking full redistribution, such that the post tax-transfer income
of a citizen equals the per capita income of the economy –

1
.
Nν

Landowners are better

off, if
πb −(1−ν)
1 −(1−ν)
Pb
<
P
k
Nv m
This expression simplifies to
µ

k
νL − 1 Pm
>
N
L − 1 Pb

¶(1−ν)

(19)

This inequality cannot hold if
µ

νL − 1 Pm
L − 1 Pb

¶(1−ν)

>

1
2

as a worker would never be elected in that case. Hence, landowners are worse off
whenever

µ

Pm
Pb

¶(1−ν)

µ

>

1 L−1
2 νL − 1

A sufficient condition for this is that
µ

¶

1 L−1
<0
2 νL − 1
which simplifies to
L>

1
2ν − 1

which holds under our large economy assumption.
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Fig. 1

Capital - Labour Ratio (No. of Threshers, Tractors & Harvesters used per 100 Agricultural Labour Force)

1

2.50
0.40

SKOR

Avg Rest of Asia
1990

African Countries
East Asian Countries
Rest of Asia
2.00

0.20

Avg
Africa
1.50

HK

1990

0.00
0.00

1960

0.05

Avg EAsia

1.00

SPORE

0.50

Avg Rest of Asia

Avg Africa
0.00
0.00

0.05

Fig. 2

0.10

0.15

1960

0.20

0.25

Share of Agricultural Labour Force

0.30

0.35

0.40

2

100

African Countries
East Asian Countries
Rest of Asia
80

Avg Africa

60

1990 (%)

Avg Rest of Asia

40

20

SKOR

Avg EASIA
HK
0
0 MACAU

SPORE

20

40

1960 (%)

60

80

100

1. Data Source: Food & Agricultural Organisation (FAO) website http://www.fao.org. The capital-labour ratio of 1960 is the no. of threshers, tractors & harvesters used in 1961 divided by the
agricultural labour force in 1960. The ratio of 1990 is derived from data in 1990. The countries studied are:
African Countries:
Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Republic, Egypt, Ethopia PDR, Gambia, Ghana, Côte dIvoire, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal, Sudan, Uganda
East Asian Countries:
Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea
Rest of Asia:
Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam
2. Data Source: FAO website (see footnote 1). The share of agricultural labour force is defined as the percentage of total labour force engaged in agricultural production. The countries studied are:
African countries:
Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Benin, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Republic, Congo Dem Republic, Egypt,
Eq Guinea, Ethopia PDR, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Côte dIvoire, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius,
Morocco, Mozambique, Nambia, Niger, Nigeria, GuineaBissau, Réunion, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Burkina Faso, Zambia, Zimbabwe
East Asian Countries:
Hong Kong, Macau, Singapore, South Korea
Rest of Asia:
Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, East Timor, India, Indonesia, Korea DPR, Laos, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines,
Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam
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